A. M. Bell v. Parley P. Jones : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1940
A. M. Bell v. Parley P. Jones : Reply Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Leon Fonnesbeck; Attorney for Defendant and Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bell v. Jones, No. 6239 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/654
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.M. BELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
PARLEY P. JONES, 
Defendant and Appellatnt. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of-"Ui.;t~ i.n a~d for Cache County. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A.M. BELL, 
Plaimiff and Respun,den:l 
vs. 
PARLEY P. JONES,-
Defendant and Appellarnt. 
Respondent argues that plaintiff was a holder in due 
course and that the court erred in failing to so hold. Coun-
sel says "there is no ditSpute in the evidence on this 
'' 1.50. i>v question, that Alfred J. Bell was owing plaintiff~ at 
the time the note was turned over to the plaintiff, and that 
plaintiff subsequently paid full value for the note." That 
statement is all disputed. 
Appellant objected (Tr. 12, Ab. 16) to the plaintiff's 
conclusion that his father was indebted to him in the sum 
fitu_o.do 
of ~:50. This i,s cited as error in assignment No. 6. 
Such evidence was obviously self-serving, gave a mere ·con-
clusion on the part of the plaintiff the very conclusion 
which the court should draw from the evidence. 
"Witness will not be permitted to state a con-
clusion of law." 22 C. J. 634-39, and numerous 
cases ·cited in note~s. 
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11 Furthermore,. w .. · hen plaintiff. attempted to explain the ~~~0 ' ' ~-he took various·item·s from an old note book which 
he claimed he had expended for his father or mother (Ab. 
19, Tr. 23). Such evidence was equally objectionable. The 
witness had even taken the liberty to write in his book, 
after this suit was started, that some of these items were 
"advanced for father". We submit that such self serving 
evidence thus built up for the occasion is not worthy of 
any ·consideration or belief, and should have been exclud-
ed by the court. 'The very fact that plaintiff had taken 
the liberty, after thi~s suit was started, to add the notation 
"advanced for father", (Ab. 19) clearly shows that these 
items were not genuine obligations, and were not prior 
thereto considered as a bona fide obligation from father 
to son. 
We have no quarrel with the rule that an existing 
bona fide indebtedness is good consideration for a note. 
But it must be real and actual past due debt. 
"On the other hand, if there is no pre-ex~sting 
debt, as where a note is given for money or proper-
ty advanced by a parent to his child, or a note is 
given to discharge a supposed liability where none 
existed, there is no ·consideration. There is no con-
sideration where the debt or obligation for which 
a note is given ha8 already been discharged either 
by the maker him~self or by a third person." 
8 c. J. 216. 
"It is****well settled that, if money i!S given as an 
advancement, it cannot afterwards be made a debt. The 
note of $2116.25 was really without any consideration, for 
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from all the evidence it is perfectly clear that the father 
intended to give his son the money when he paid it." Bob-
lett vs. Barlo\v, 83 SW 145, 26 KyL 1076. 
We submit the evidence in case at bar fairly shows, 
by admissions of both father and son, that neither con-
sidered it a real indebtedness. The father had helped the 
son when he was younger in business, later the son paid 
father and mother ba·ck. Surely such dealings between 
father and son, cannot be deemed and considered as act-
ual and bona fide indebtedness by father to son. 
The son testified: "I loaned !!J.Oney from father, when 
I need it, when I was young in business. When I got older 
and got in business for myself, I intended to help father 
and mother back." This was exactly what he did, ac·cord-
ing to his own testimoney (A b. 19-20). The father on this 
point said: 
"I _don't remember what my son had done for me be-
fore he came back from Honolulu. I can't remember 
where or when it was that I turned the note over to him. 
I know immediately after he returned from Honolulu he 
paid my wife's hospital bill. I .could :not say how soon. 
That was his mother. We, like other parents did a lot for 
our ·children, they help us back later on. I hope we are 
not different from other folks in that respect." _(Ab. 26.) 
Under such set of facts, I submit the son would not 
be permitted by any court to recover a judgment against 
his father, and if that be true there was no valid consider-
ation for this note. 
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·Furthertnore,· thi~s 'note wa'S transfered after matu-rity 
of the first installment thereof, which amount was unpaid 
at the time. One who takes after maturity is not a bona 
fide holder. 8 C. J. 344. One who takes an instrument 
after maturity is not a holder in due course, but takes it 
subject to all equities and defenses arising out of the paper 
itself and attaching to it, or out of the traJnsaction with 
reference to \vhich the paper was made. 3 R. C. L. 1945. 
Equally there is no justifi·cation for counsel's· state-
ment that "plaintiff later paid full value for the note," be-
cause all of the evidence of purported payments offered 
subsequent to June 15, 1936, was excluded. (Ab. 17-18.) 
Counsel says "even if Alfred J. Bell had told this 
plaintiff all that he had known about it, yet plaintiff would 
have been a bona fide purchaser for value under Section 
61-1-57." We cannot agree. Had Alfred J. Bell told to 
his son all he knew, or what counsel claims to be the fact, 
about this he would have said, "here is a note for $850.00 
signed by Alfred ·J. Bell. It repre,gents the balance of the 
purch~se price on the land I sold to Jones. When Jones 
got a Federal Land Bank loan on this Ian d, I signed a 
~scale-down agreement to take $150.00 as satisfaction in 
full of the existing indebtedness from Jones to me. When 
I signed that scale-down agreement, I represented to the 
Federal Land Bank that the existing indebtedness was 
only $400.00. It was in fact more than that, it was this 
note, $850.00, in addition to the $400.00. This $850.00 
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note was really a side-agreement between me and Jones, 
which I said nothing about in the scale-dp'Y.n agreement 
that I signed. Now you take this note, if you can collect it 
you can have it." I submit that if plaintiff had thus been 
told the facts, he would have "knowledge of such facts that 
his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad 
faith", as Section 61-1-57 provides. 
Hence we submit that the court below made no error 
in holdi·ng that plaintiff was not a bona fide holder for 
value in due course. 
On page 6, counsel attempts to justify the court's 
finding that defendant owed plaintiff $1250.00 as the bal-
ance on land contract, by saying Alfred J. Bell so testified. 
I 
We submit that Alfred J. Bell did not so testify. If any 
one so testified it was his ·counsel, to which leading quest-
ion Bell merely assented. 
But counsel fails to answer the important question on 
this point which we raised in our main brief: If the exist-
ing indebtedness was $1250.00 (and not $400.00) then it 
is apparent that when Alfred J. Bell signed the scale-down 
agreement (scaling down to $150.00) he did so on condi-
tion, or at least with the understanding that appellant give 
him (Bell) a note for $850.00. In other words Jones was 
required by Bell to absorb $850.00 of the $1100.00 which 
Alfred J. Bell really scaled down. For Bell agreed to take 
$150.00 as settlement in full for the existing indebtedness 
between them. That is the very reason why the $850.00 
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6 
note sued on is void, for such acts are against public 
policy, as we show by the authorities i'n our main brief. It 
was ·certainly equally viscious and equally misleading to 
the F·ederal Land Bank. If Bell had stated that the ex-
isting indebtedness was $1250.00, in his scale-down agree-
ment, and had agreed to take $150.00 as settlement, then, 
counsel admits that Bell could not take a note from Jones 
for any part of the amount scaled down. But counsel ar-
gues that Bell is now in a more favored position, because 
he misstated and misrepresented what the existing indebt-
edness was. 
We do not believe the court should allow Alfred J. 
Bell to do indirectly by misrepresentation what he could 
not do directly. If he had correctly stated the amount of 
the existing indebtedness and agreed ·to take $150.00 as 
settlement, that ends it. He could not then have a valid 
side agreement with debtor to pay any back part of the 
amount scaled down. Neither should he be allowed to 
falsely state the amount of the existing indebtedness to be 
$400.00, if it in fact was more; and then take a note from 
creditor representing the difference between the actual 
existing indebtedness and the amount which creditor Bell 
·stated and represented it to be, in his signed scale-down 
agreement. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEON FONNESBECK, 
Attorney for Defendant an.d Appe:ll'ant. 
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